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Abstract: 
An important difference between family and nonfamily firms, and among different types of 
family firms, is in the way they make outsourcing decisions and thereby define the boundaries of 
the firm. The authors propose that transaction costs arising from human asset specificity, threats 
of opportunism, and risk aversion will make small- and medium-sized family firms operating 
with technologies of low to medium complexity less likely to outsource than comparable 
nonfamily firms. The authors also argue that the limiting influence of transaction costs on the 
outsourcing decisions of family firms may be mitigated by variations in available suppliers, 
goals, and ownership structures. 
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Article: 
Introduction 
Two fundamental questions about firms are why they exist and what determines their boundaries 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2004; Coase, 1937; Conner, 1991). Likewise, two related questions—why 
do family and nonfamily firms both exist and what determines the boundaries of these two types 
of firms—drive much of the research and theory on family business. Asking the second set of 
questions and providing some answers to a particular aspect of those questions are the objectives 
of this study. These objectives are important. Since family firms existed long before nonfamily 
firms, the emergence of the latter form of organization may be because the boundary decisions of 
family firms were in some ways inefficient or left certain societal needs unfilled, necessitating 
the creation and growth of the younger nonfamily business sector. If true, then it also implies that 
nonfamily firms define their boundaries differently. 
There are two dimensions that define a firm’s boundaries. The first dimension deals with the 
kinds of businesses in which the firm is involved, whereas the second is about the set of 
productive activities that are conducted by the firm in a particular line of business. This study is 
about the second dimension—whether and why family and nonfamily firms make different 
decisions with respect to which productive activities to perform in-house. To date, family 
business researchers have investigated the boundaries between family and family enterprise 
systems within the framework of the firm’s internal environment (e.g., Basco & Rodriguez, 
2009; Distelberg & Blow, in press) but limited attention has been given to the boundaries 
between the family enterprise system and its external environment, which is the focus of our 
article. For the purpose of exposition, we use “outsourcing” to mean that the firm draws its 
boundary to exclude a particular productive activity and buys the needed products or services 
associated with that activity from an external supplier. We address two important research 
questions regarding family firm governance and outsourcing: (a) How do differences in the 
governance structures of family and nonfamily firms cause differences in their outsourcing 
decisions? (b) How do heterogeneities among family firms cause variations in family firms’ 
propensity to outsource? As will be discussed in more depth below, we focus on small- and 
medium-sized firms that compete in industries using technologies of low to medium complexity 
because both size and technology can affect transaction costs (see Verbeke & Kano, 2010). 
Transaction cost theory has been developed specifically to address the question about firm 
boundaries. According to transaction cost theory, asset specificity, opportunism, and risk 
preference lead firms to choose between hierarchical governance and market contracting (Chiles 
& McMackin, (1996); Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Kim & Mahoney, 2005; Poppo & 
Zenger, 1998; Tsang, 2006; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). These choices specify the extent to 
which a firm makes or buys the products or services required for its productive activities (Walker 
& Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1981, 2005). Thus, boundary decisions separate the activities 
conducted internally by the firm from those that are obtained from outside suppliers. 
Apart from the fact that transaction cost theory is specifically designed to address the firm 
boundary question, researchers have proposed that family firms represent a variant form of the 
hierarchical governance structure in transaction cost theory (e.g., Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010). Therefore, this study relies mainly on a comparison of transaction costs to 
address the two research questions asked. 
The study contributes to the literature by using the concepts of human asset specificity, 
opportunism, and risk aversion to explain why the propensity of family firms to outsource might 
be different from that of nonfamily firms. It adds to our understanding about how family and 
nonfamily firms are different. We further contribute to the literature by examining some of the 
contingencies that are likely to modify the preferences of small- and medium-sized family firms 
for outsourcing rather than producing internally. By identifying these contingencies, we also 
improve our understanding about the heterogeneity of family firms. In short, we contribute to the 
literature by incorporating insights from transaction cost theory into the emerging theory of the 
family firm (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005). 
Transaction Cost Theory: 
An Overview 
Despite the importance of firm governance, transaction cost theory has been underutilized in the 
study of family firms. This is surprising because transaction cost theory is specifically designed 
to explain the governance decisions of organizations and the efficient boundaries of a firm (Kim 
& Mahoney, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1985). In transaction cost 
theory, the principal factors affecting governance decisions under bounded rationality are asset 
specificity and opportunism (Geyskens et al., 2006; Tsang, 2006; Williamson, 1985).1 However, 
recent studies suggest that risk preference can also be important (Chiles et al., 1996; Williamson, 
1991). Williamson (1985) suggests that transactions are the basic unit of organizational analysis, 
involving a contract to transfer goods or services from one party to another. In a broader sense, 
transaction costs can be considered as the “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969, 
p. 48). Economizing on costs is central to transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and 
economizing is achieved through the choice of markets, hierarchies, or hybrid governance 
structures (Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Walker & Weber, 1984). 
As Table 1 shows, market transactions involve hard bargaining between parties whose identities 
are irrelevant because there is no dependency between buyers and sellers once the transaction is 
completed. Therefore, there is no risk of opportunism past the duration of the transaction and 
parties that behave in that manner can be easily replaced. Hierarchy is an alternative governance 
structure needed to perform the transactions internally within the firm’s boundary (Williamson, 
1985). In hierarchical governance, a firm owns and/or controls the financial and human capital 
needed to perform the transactions required in its value chain (see Porter, 1985). The firm also 
can more easily access and accurately evaluate information that is created or acquired in the 
performance of the productive activity. Hence, by definition, hierarchical governance implies 
that the firm has relatively high control over transactions and their associated costs whereas 
markets imply that the firm has relatively low control. However, hierarchical governance 
requires the firm to set up monitoring and incentive systems to control opportunism within the 
organization. In hybrid governance, parties are autonomous but bilaterally dependent (David & 
Han, 2004) because contracts are long term in nature but still incomplete in the presence of 
bounded rationality. Identities then become relevant because the parties in the transaction must 
know who to go to when renegotiations and realignments are needed to prevent maladaptation. 
As Williamson (1985) argues, rational economic reasons exist for organizing transactions one 
way or another. We discuss these reasons in their general sense below without differentiating 
between family and nonfamily firms. Arguments about the differences between the two forms of 
firm governance are developed in the next section. 
Table 1. A Comparison of Governance Structures 
Governance Structures   General Characteristics 
Market     Hard bargaining 
Irrelevance of the identity of the parties 
No dependency between buyers and sellers 
Hybrid  Ownership autonomy accompanied by bilateral dependency 
of parties 
Relevance of parties’ identity in case of premature 
termination or persistent maladaptation 
Incomplete contracts require special adaptive mechanisms 
for effective realignment and restoration of efficiency 
Hierarchy     Internal organization 
Incentive instruments that promote a team orientation 
Easy access to and accurate assessment of information 
Note. Adapted from Williamson (1991). 
Transactions involve both ex ante contracting costs associated with the drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding of an agreement and ex post contracting costs related to maladaptation, haggling to 
correct misalignments, and setup, operating, and bonding costs (Williamson, 1985). Within the 
framework of the problem of contracting, the partner with the bargaining power (Blois, 1972; 
Coff, 1999) should have an advantage in minimizing both ex ante and ex post costs of 
contracting via dominance in negotiation, meaning that “the organization of economic activity is 
under the control of those who possess power” (Williamson, 1985, p. 124). 
Williamson (1985) suggests that because individuals are boundedly rational, asset specificity and 
opportunism are important determinants of governance decisions. Bounded rationality suggests 
that individuals will behave “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961, p. 24) 
because they do not possess perfect information nor the time or mental capacity to fully process 
information. With respect to governance decisions, this means that (a) firms are unable to 
maximize utilities (Simon, 1955) as neoclassical economic theorists claim (Savage, 1954), (b) 
information asymmetries exist between suppliers and buyers, and (c) “contracts are normally 
incomplete” (Lafontaine & Slade, 2007, p. 649). These bounds to the ability of decision makers 
inevitably lead to satisfying behavior (Simon, 1959) in the governance of transactions to deter 
the potential, but difficult-to-predict opportunism of economic actors (Williamson, 1985).  
Opportunism involves “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) on the part of 
agents. Although bargaining in a transaction naturally involves the pursuit of self-interest on the 
part of both parties to an exchange, opportunism implies a certain amount of deception with 
regard to either the ability of a party to fulfill the terms of the contract (adverse selection) or their 
willingness to expend the required effort after the contract has been enacted (moral hazard). The 
more opportunism is a threat, owing to differential bargaining power and behavioral uncertainty 
in a particular set of recurring transactions, the greater the likelihood that a firm will opt for a 
hierarchical form of governance. 
Asset specificity deals with the extent to which resources can be redeployed to other uses and 
entails site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets 
(Noteboom, 1993; Williamson, 1975, 1985). A fundamental premise of transaction cost theory is 
that high asset specificity leaves a firm vulnerable to opportunism owing to a paucity of 
alternatives available to redeploy assets in small numbers bargaining situations (Williamson, 
1981). Therefore, the cost of governing transactions through market mechanisms when high asset 
specificity operates is thought to outweigh the benefits of flexibility and reductions in capital 
investments and overhead. In such situations hierarchy is expected to be more efficient and 
research has tended to support that contention (David & Han, 2004; Lafontaine & Slade, 2007; 
Poppo & Zenger, 1998). 
Moreover, governance choices (Williamson, 1985; Walker & Weber, 1984) involve 
management’s ex ante evaluation of future outcomes (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Risk is 
defined as the “possibility of loss” (Yates & Stone, 1992, p. 4). Risk preferences are based on 
factors such as individual dispositions (Laughunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980) and organizational 
culture (Morgan, 1986). The extent to which a firm is risk averse will exacerbate the influence of 
asset specificity and opportunism on governance choices (Chiles & McMackin, 1996), because at 
every level of asset specificity or possible opportunism, the associated risk of using a 
nonhierarchical governance structure will be less acceptable. Therefore, managers’ risk 
preferences (Williamson, 1991) should also influence governance decisions regarding 
outsourcing.  
In summary, higher levels of opportunism, asset specificity, and risk aversion are expected to 
lower the propensity to engage in outsourcing. However, as Carney (2005) and Gedajlovic and 
Carney (2010) note, the characteristics of hierarchical governance under family control as 
opposed to nonfamily control will vary in terms of decision making and resources. In the next 
section, we extend this reasoning to explain why these characteristics will differentially influence 
more specific governance decisions such as outsourcing in family firms.2  
Outsourcing in the Transaction Cost Context 
Before developing our arguments regarding how the governance choices of family and 
nonfamily firms affect their propensities to outsource productive activities, it is important to 
discuss the determinants of outsourcing within the context of transaction cost theory. As already 
mentioned, we use the term outsourcing to mean the firm’s decisions about the combination of 
productive activities to include within its boundaries. 
Outsourcing is relevant only if the firm has the ability to produce internally and external 
suppliers also exist as a viable option. Therefore, our analysis assumes that this condition holds 
for both family and nonfamily firms. Furthermore, the outsourcing decision can be affected by 
other factors in addition to transaction costs. For example, the firm must compare differences in 
production costs as well as differences in transaction costs to make the outsourcing decision. 
Outsourcing decisions may also be affected by competition and market power in the supplier 
market, which may generate rents unrelated to transaction costs that are appropriable through 
internal production. In short, outsourcing decisions can be based on other factors besides 
transaction costs. However, since these factors seem unlikely to vary systematically among 
family and nonfamily firms, comparing outsourcing decisions from a transaction cost perspective 
is valid. 
Governance and Outsourcing in Family Firms 
Family firms are defined by the involvement and control of a family in firm ownership and 
management and the potential ability and intention to achieve family-centered goals by 
maintaining transgenerational control (see Chrisman et al., 2005; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 
1999). Family involvement and family intentions in turn are expected to affect firm behavior 
with regard to opportunity pursuance and resource acquisition and deployment (Sharma & 
Manikutty, 2005; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Family firms often possess family-centered noneconomic goals that include the perpetuation of a 
family’s dynasty, values, harmony, and social capital, as well as the ability to behave 
altruistically to family members (Chrisman et al., 2005). Although achievement of such goals 
can reduce economic performance (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) they can create 
socioemotional wealth for the family (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) and encourage transgenerational control of the firm (Chrisman, Chua, & 
Litz, 2003). Furthermore, unified family ownership and management (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, 
& Lansberg, 1997) leads to the parsimonious use of assets, superior and unconstrained control 
over firm-specific transactions, and the use of particularistic criteria in decision making (Carney, 
2005). Put simply, the involvement and influence of a family in a firm leads to goals and the 
discretion to pursue those goals that generally do not exist in nonfamily firms. As discussed 
below, the differential reference point for economizing on transactions that characterize family 
firms shifts their indifference point between governance choices, thereby making them less likely 
to outsource than nonfamily firms. 
Because our comparison of the transaction costs of these two types of firms largely depends on 
differences in the specificity of human assets, firm size and production technology are important 
considerations (Verbeke & Kano, 2010). Size is important because the comparison assumes that 
the same production tasks may be managed by either family or nonfamily members. However, in 
large, professionally managed family firms, nonfamily managers occupy the majority of the 
management positions, making the comparisons of family and nonfamily managers of less 
relevance. Therefore, the discussion of transaction costs and outsourcing in this article is most 
pertinent to small- and medium-sized firms where family members are more likely to be 
involved in all 
aspects of firm governance, management, and even 
operations. 
The nature of the technology affects the analysis in 
two ways. First, as technological complexity increases, 
the assumption that the required tasks can be performed 
as efficiently and effectively by either a family or nonfamily 
firm becomes less valid because the pool of nonfamily 
members who can perform the tasks better than 
family members would be larger (Verbeke & Kano, 2010). 
Second, the necessity and ability to meter how managers 
and employees perform productive activities is affected 
by the discretion the technology allows the operator. For 
example, if the technology allows the operator no discretion 
then opportunism would not be an issue. Our analysis 
assumes that the firms operate with a technology that 
is of low to medium complexity and allows sufficient 
discretion for opportunism to arise. 
Asset Specificity and Opportunism  
Williamson (1981) draws attention to asset specificity as the most important factor governing 
transactions. As suggested above, this is because asset specificity increases the firm’s 
vulnerability to the opportunistic behavior of suppliers or buyers, its ability to achieve 
competitive differentiation, and the difficulty of obtaining inputs from alternative sources 
(Noteboom, 1993). Owing to their interrelatedness, we deal with asset specificity and 
opportunism together in this section. 
Among the various sources of asset specificity, human assets are particularly pertinent to 
understanding the distinctive governance decisions of family firms since, as suggested above, 
family involvement and influence is the primary source of the differences between family and 
nonfamily firms and a potential source of competitive advantage (Habbershon & Williams, 
1999). Human asset specificity is defined both by the degree to which aspects of human capital 
such as job skills are specific to a particular firm and by the ease of metering individual 
productivity (Pollak, 1985; Williamson, 1981, 1985). When job skills are highly transferable and 
metering is easy, employees can be hired and fired without a serious loss of productivity or high 
replacement costs (Williamson, 1981). On the other hand, when the value of human assets is 
largely firm-specific, or when metering employee productivity is difficult, hierarchical 
governance is thought to provide the most efficient governance structure (Williamson, 1981). As 
discussed below, family involvement leads to unique challenges and solutions in metering 
productivity as well as firm-specific human capital. We deal with metering first. 
When metering productivity is difficult, the family form of organizational hierarchy has natural 
advantages over either the nonfamily form or nonhierarchical governance (Burkart, Panunzi, & 
Shleifer, 2001; Ouchi, 1980; Pollak, 1985). Transactions are embedded in relations that usually 
develop over time (Noteboom, 1996). Families are characterized by long-term relationships and 
in family firms, owners and managers tend to share family ties (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Zahra, 
2003). In addition, family members are more likely to identify with the business and perceive a 
link between the fate of the business and their own well-being. The linkage among family 
members and between the family and the business tend to intensify commitment to the structure, 
procedures, and values of the firm (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 2008; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Sharma & Irving, 2005). These characteristics of the human assets of 
family firms can reduce (but not eliminate) the possibility of opportunism and therefore the need 
for complex contracts, explicit auditing, and assessments that create transaction costs (Ouchi, 
1980). 
Another critical factor that increases human asset specificity in family firms is the pursuit of 
family-centered noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al., 2005), which generate socioemotional 
value (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The pursuit of unique family-centered noneconomic goals 
(e.g., family harmony, family status, family dynasty, altruism) suggests that the skills and 
behaviors needed to achieve these goals will be more difficult to obtain in the marketplace and 
the attainment of these goals more difficult to evaluate (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009). 
However, such goals and behaviors, particularly altruism, which links the welfare of parents to 
that of their children, can also increase trust and communication and reduce opportunism. 
Although opportunism is less likely when altruism is reciprocal rather than asymmetrical 
(Chrisman et al., 2005; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005; Schulze et al., 2001; Stark, 
1995), opportunism will generally be lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms even if 
altruism is asymmetric (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), a contention that 
has empirical support (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). 
Finally, family firms are also thought to be particularly adept at monitoring the behavior of 
family members owing to their close connections, superior knowledge about one another, and 
ability to use both organizational and familial sanctions to limit opportunistic tendencies (Pollak, 
1985). Although altruism can negatively affect the enforcement of behaviors needed to attain 
economic goals (Schulze et al., 2001) it may contribute to the achievement of noneconomic 
goals. However, the ability of family firms to monitor the behavior of nonfamily employees or 
outside contractors for the achievement of economic goals should be no better or worse than that 
of nonfamily firms; it may in fact be worse owing to the tendency of family to use informal 
rather than formal methods for evaluating performance (Chua et al., 2009). Moreover, there is no 
offsetting noneconomic benefit to the family firm if outsiders shirk.  
Thus, in situations where metering is difficult, the family form of organization should be more 
prevalent because of its advantages in controlling intrafirm opportunism (Burkart et al., 2001; 
Chang, Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2008). Furthermore, although family firms are a 
response to metering difficulties, their governance structures also makes metering more difficult 
outside the sphere of influence of the family, which diminishes the desirability of outsourcing 
productive activities. 
Proposition 1: The transaction costs of in-house production through hierarchical 
governance will be lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms as the difficulty of 
metering productivity increases. 
Gedajlovic and Carney (2010) further note that some classes of assets, such as social capital, 
reputation, and tacit knowledge may be difficult to transfer across firms or replace through 
market transactions. Those authors argue that family firms are uniquely suited to develop and use 
these assets, which are largely embedded in the family’s control and human capital investment in 
the firm. 
Family firms have natural advantages in situations where specialized knowledge is developed 
through an extended period of training (e.g., craft industries). Unlike the case that exists in 
nonfamily firms, the human capital of family members in a family firm tends to be developed 
through long apprenticeships (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). The hands-on personalized 
experience gained via “learning-by-doing” between senior and junior family business members 
starts at home, continues through adolescence in the form of summer jobs, and extends through 
the career of family members in the firm (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004). When based 
on tacit knowledge gained through on-the-job training, the highly specific human assets of 
family members in family firms (Penrose, 1959; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) are not easy to transfer or 
replace. Similarly, the longterm emersion of family members in the firm and the two-way flows 
of resources between the family and the firm (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Sharma, 
2008) should facilitate the development and utilization of social capital (Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 
2008) and reputational assets (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
Thus, we propose that when the services of critical human assets are intangible, sticky to the 
firm, and difficult to replace (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010), family firms will have an advantage 
over nonfamily firms. Moreover, given these conditions, and the advantages they generate, 
family firms are more likely than nonfamily firms to rely on hierarchical arrangements for 
governing their productive activities rather than market or hybrid governance mechanisms and 
consequently less likely to outsource their productive activities. 
Proposition 2: The transaction costs of in-house production through hierarchical 
governance will be lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms as the importance of 
difficult-to-replace firmspecific human assets increases. 
Risk Aversion 
Higher levels of ownership concentration have been associated with risk aversion in the family 
firm literature (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002) and 
family business owners appear to be particularly risk averse (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & 
Gutierrez, 2001; Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2001; Schulze et al., 2001). Family firms are 
also parsimonious when using family wealth because it is their money and because such wealth 
is often not diversified (Carney, 2005). This may limit the scope of their activities and cause 
them to refrain from undertaking risky business ventures (Morck & Yeung, 2003). This aversion 
to risk appears to be especially pronounced when the activity threatens to reduce the family’s 
control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Furthermore, as discussed above, family firms 
are likely to possess characteristics that increase the desirability of hierarchical governance and, 
conversely, the risk of outsourcing. Thus, although outsourcing might have the potential for cost 
and performance efficiencies, family firms appear to be more likely to perceive the risk of 
producing internally to be lower than outsourcing options even when the latter have higher 
expected values, especially when the family perceives threats to their continuing control of the 
firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Proposition 3: Family firms are more likely to be risk averse than nonfamily firms when 
evaluating the transaction costs of outsourcing productive activities. 
Propensities to Outsource 
In the previous section, we argued that the transaction costs of in-house production through 
hierarchical governance will be lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms as the difficulty of 
metering productivity increases and as the importance of difficult-to-replace firm-specific human 
assets increases. We also argued that family firms will be more risk averse in terms of the 
transaction costs associated with outsourcing options. Since, according to transaction cost theory 
the difficulty of metering suppliers’ productivity, the limited ability to replace firm-specific 
human assets, and risk aversion will tend to deter outsourcing, we propose the following: 
Proposition 4: Family firms are less likely to outsource than nonfamily firms. 
Contingencies Affecting Outsourcing in Family Firms 
In spite of our contentions regarding their propensity to avoid outsourcing, family firms are not a 
homogenous population (Basco & Rodriguez, 2009; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). Thus, we reason 
that certain contingencies will increase the likelihood of outsourcing among family firms. In this 
section, we deal with three important contingencies that capture essential features influencing 
family firm governance: the potential familial relationship between the owners of the firm and its 
suppliers, the importance of economic versus noneconomic goals, and the concentration of 
control in family firms. These contingencies get to the heart of the distinctions among family 
firms from a transaction cost perspective because, respectively, they address the ability to limit 
supplier opportunism, the influence of economizing relative to other goals on governance 
choices, and the ability of hierarchical governance to control conflicts of interest. 
Outsourcing With Kin-Controlled Firms 
As noted above, the threat of opportunism is considered lower among family members than 
among nonrelated individuals or economic entities, as family members are connected by “a 
common bond” and “a set of mutual expectations” and tend to engage in business relationships 
through “informal agreements based on affection rather than utilitarian logic or contractual 
obligations” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001, p. 82). Thus, relationships among family members are 
often perceived to be of higher value than economizing on transactions. Indeed, exchange often 
has a noneconomic social dimension (i.e., intrinsic utility) as well as an extrinsic economic 
utility (Noteboom, 1996) that will be particularly relevant to family firms. 
Thus, we argue that family firms are more likely to outsource to suppliers who are controlled by 
individuals who share kinship ties with the owners of the focal firm. Kin solidarity and trust act 
as self-reinforcing social control mechanisms, constraining opportunistic behavior, thereby 
reducing the need for complex contracts and lowering the transaction costs of finding, 
negotiating with, and monitoring exchange partners (Gulati, 1995; Landa, 1981; Mustakallio, 
Autio, & Zahra, 2002; North, 1984, 1991; Peng, 2004). Social control mechanisms are in line 
with family firms’ personal rather than formal approach and intrafamily monitoring abilities 
(Pollak, 1985). Lower potential for opportunism and less risk aversion toward suppliers with 
kinship ties can, therefore, increase the likelihood of family firms’ outsourcing. 
On the other hand, the parties in impersonal exchanges are more likely to take advantage of each 
other, necessitating specific and precise contracts and costly measures to enforce compliance 
(Macher & Richman, 2008; North, 1984). Despite contractual safeguards, bounded rationality 
makes it difficult to distinguish trustworthy individuals from untrustworthy individuals (Macher 
& Richman, 2008). As a result, an untrustworthy supplier’s nonfulfillment of contractual terms 
can prevent a firm from meeting its customers’ orders or demands (Choi & Krause, 2006; Lajili 
& Mahoney, 2006) and threaten the family firm’s reputational and social capital advantages 
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Pearson et al., 2008). In addition to 
the loss of control and associated holdup problem, suppliers may eventually take advantage of 
the learning that occurs through the contractual relationship to become competitors (Mieghem, 
1999). Suppliers may also engage in collusive activities such as price increases (Choi & Krause, 
2006) and owing to bounded rationality and information asymmetries, the buyer cannot be sure 
whether the supplier is exerting sufficient effort to keep prices down (Kawasaki & McMillan, 
1987). Thus, family firms that decide to outsource should prefer suppliers with whom they share 
kinship ties to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior. 
Moreover, particularism (Carney, 2005) in outsourcing with family members is also consistent 
with efforts directed toward transgenerational control, continued family involvement, and 
socioemotional wealth considerations (Chrisman et al., 2003). For example, outsourcing to kin-
controlled firms may expand job creation opportunities for family members, which is often a 
primary goal in family firms (Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000; Ram & Holliday, 1993), 
while still addressing the human asset specificity and risk aversion issues that normally work 
against the selection of the outsourcing option.  
In addition, the exchange of inside information with kin-controlled suppliers should be easier and 
more likely to be mutually beneficial (Campbell, 1979; Demsetz, 1986; Healy & Palepu, 2001) 
owing to the family relationships that link the firms. Thus, both the family firm and its kin-
controlled suppliers may have better and more personal knowledge about their partner’s 
operations and personnel (Mustakallio et al., 2002), which can reduce the risk of poor 
performance and the need for close monitoring. 
Family business members may also feel obligated to serve or help kin without expectations of 
immediate reciprocity (Chang, Memili, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Chua, 2009; Karra, Tracey, & 
Phillips, 2006). Willingness to compromise and forbearance are common among kin to preserve 
family harmony (Hill, 1995). “Filial piety” (i.e., devotion and obligation to family) can enhance 
conformity and cooperative behaviors, which attenuate agency problems and transaction costs 
(Hill, 1995) in family firms. The filial piety of kin-controlled suppliers can reduce the risk of 
opportunism and potential loss of advantages based on human asset specificity. 
For these reasons, we expect that the negative effects of human asset specificity, risk aversion, 
and threats of agent opportunism on the outsourcing decisions of family firms will be diminished 
when suppliers are kin-controlled.3 
Proposition 5: Family firms with suppliers with whom they share kinship ties will 
perceive lower transaction costs in outsourcing and thus favor outsourcing more than 
those without such suppliers. 
Economic Versus Noneconomic Goals 
Transactions generate concern for the efficient use of resources (Walker & Weber, 1984) and 
economizing on transaction costs is assumed to be a primary goal in organizations (Williamson, 
1985). However, organizations may have a variety of goals (Cyert & March, 1963). Although 
family firms are expected to place more emphasis on noneconomic goals than nonfamily firms, 
the degree to which they pursue economic and noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al., 2003, 
Chrisman et al., 2005; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) will vary. When there is more emphasis on 
noneconomic goals than economic goals, family firms may be willing to forego the opportunities 
available through outsourcing in favor of maintaining control and providing opportunities to 
family members (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Kelly et al., 2000). For example, owing in part to 
their noneconomic goals, family firms are expected to have greater difficulty in shedding 
resources and business activities than nonfamily firms. 
However, when economic goals dominate, the tendency of family firms toward parsimony 
(Carney, 2005) may take precedence in decision making. When parsimony is the driving force, 
both production and transactions costs must be assessed (Williamson, 1985), and as Walker and 
Weber (1984) show, production costs are often more salient, particularly since they are more 
easily measured. Thus, outsourcing and other resource management practices (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003) that might improve efficiency will be of greater importance to family firms as their 
emphasis on economic rather than noneconomic goals increases. In this instance, a family firm’s 
efforts to evaluate, shed, add, bundle, and leverage resources to attain competitive advantages 
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) will be more consistent with the transaction cost principles of 
economizing (Williamson, 1981, 1985).4  
 Family firms focusing on wealth creation will therefore direct greater efforts to improve quality, 
decrease production costs, and increase flexibility than increasing family harmony or providing 
jobs to family members. Assuming outsourcing offers such opportunities, the extent to which 
family firms emphasize economic goals will mitigate to some extent concerns related to human 
asset specificity, potential for opportunism, and risk aversion in family firms since some of these 
concerns emanate from the pursuit of noneconomic goals. As a consequence, the odds that the 
outsourcing option will be pursued should increase. In fact, outsourcing can improve a firm’s 
coordination efficiencies and flexibility to respond to changes in demand and technology, both of 
which can shorten product development cycles (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002). Outsourcing 
can also allow a firm access to a wider range of skills while allowing it to concentrate on 
improvements to its core competencies (Mieghem, 1999). By allowing short-term capacity 
adjustments in the face of demand fluctuations, outsourcing can reduce the firm’s investments in 
facilities, equipment, and inventories (Atamturk & Hochbaum, 2001) as well as its business risk 
(Leiblein et al., 2002; Mieghem, 1999). Thus, owing to the potential cost saving and other 
advantages of outsourcing, we propose the following. 
Proposition 6: Family firms that value economic goals more than noneconomic goals will 
perceive lower transaction costs in outsourcing and thus favor outsourcing more than 
those that do not. 
Control Concentration 
Gersick et al. (1997) defines control concentration as the degree to which firm ownership is 
shared among family members. Concentrated control by a single family owner is the most 
common ownership configuration but sibling partnerships, where ownership is spread among a 
small number of closely related family members, and cousin consortiums, and where ownership 
is held by a larger number of more distantly related family members also exist (Carney, 2005; 
Gersick et al., 1997; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2005). 
The propensity of family firms to outsource productive activities may vary depending on their 
ownership configurations. When family firms have low control concentration, participation and 
diversity in decision making should increase (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns & 
Eddleston, 2004). On the other hand, in situations where ownership is concentrated among one 
or a very small number of family members, those in control have virtually complete authority. 
For example, in family firms that are still owned wholly or primarily by the founder, the founder-
owner controls the information flow to others and shapes the family firm’s strategic behavior and 
interactions with the external environment (Kelly et al., 2000). In such situations, family firms 
tend to function according to the values, missions, and visions established by founders rather 
than searching for new strategic approaches. Thus, family firms with high ownership and control 
concentration may focus more on internal issues such as improving functional expertise than on 
identifying external opportunities (Kelly et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, when the firm is controlled by one or a very small number of individuals, the 
socioemotional value of maintaining family control may be greater because the potential 
successor is more likely to come from the founder’s immediate family (see Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). In contrast, in sibling partnerships potential successors may be dispersed among several 
nuclear families. The diminished probability that the successor will be a direct descendent of a 
particular owner may reduce the attraction of continued control. In cousin consortiums the family 
ownership group would include even more distant relations, some of whom may have little direct 
involvement in the firm. Finally, as control concentration decreases, goal diversity should 
increase. Thus, the possibility that noneconomic goals will generate socioemotional value for 
family members decreases as ownership becomes more diverse and dispersed. 
As a transaction cost study by Walker and Weber (1984) shows, the power distribution and the 
amount of discretion decision makers exercise, may affect make– buy decisions. We expect that 
low control concentration in family firms can lead to the creativity and openness needed to adopt 
new approaches and take risks, such as outsourcing to achieve efficiencies (Williamson, 1981, 
1985). Moreover, as control concentration decreases, interactions with outsiders tend to be more 
frequent and open (Kelly et al., 2000). Openness to external perspectives can facilitate the 
emphasis on finding and exploiting new opportunities outside the family business, such as 
outsourcing. 
As control concentration decreases, family governance should tend to become more similar to 
the managerial governance that characterizes nonfamily firms (Carney, 2005). As interests 
become more diverse and family relationships become more distant, the possibility of 
opportunism within the family firm increases whereas the advantages of the human capital 
embedded in family membership may decrease. Moreover, as the relationships among family 
members become more distant, the ability to monitor and discipline family managers may be 
reduced (Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Pollak, 1985). If the risk of opportunism among family 
business members increases, the attractiveness of hierarchical versus nonhierarchical governance 
structures decreases, making outsourcing a more attractive option. 
Proposition 7: The lower the control concentration in a family firm, the lower will be the 
perceived transaction costs of outsourcing versus in-house production and thus the more 
the firm will favor outsourcing. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Governance decisions influence the performance and long-term survival of all firms but little 
attention has been paid to family firms even though they constitute a major portion of the world 
economy (Dyer & Handler, 1994) and face many challenges that remain theoretically and 
practically unclear (Dyer, 2003; Hoy & Verser, 1994). In this article, we attempt to provide some 
initial answers to two important research questions that address one of these challenges: How do 
differences in the governance structures of family and nonfamily firms affect the outsourcing 
decisions in family firms and under what conditions do family firms decide to outsource? We 
propose that human asset specificity, opportunism, and risk aversion will make family firms less 
likely to engage in outsourcing. We then extend this reasoning by suggesting that the availability 
of kin-controlled suppliers, the importance of economic goals, and lower control concentration 
will be positively associated with family firms’ outsourcing. Future research is needed, however, 
to compare outsourcing among family and nonfamily firms and empirically test the effects of the 
aforementioned contingencies on family firm governance. Such research can be accomplished 
either qualitatively or quantitatively by examining the value chains of family and nonfamily 
firms and by assessing the basis for the decisions on the productive activities performed in-house 
as opposed to those performed through market and/or relational contracting. 
We contribute to the literature by using transaction cost theory to explain some of the differences 
in the governance of family firms versus nonfamily firms. We use outsourcing to illustrate these 
differences because such decisions get to the heart of governance decisions as reflected in 
transaction cost theory and are more readily testable and observable than the initial decisions that 
lead to the formation of family firms. Not only does this add to our understanding of family firm 
governance and provide avenues for future research, but it also suggests the value of the 
transaction cost perspective to family business studies. Our article also deals with some of the 
contingencies that might increase the propensity of different types of family firms to outsource. 
Thus, we have shown how the nature of the family firm might influence its boundaries without 
assuming that the decisions of family firms are uniform. Both these contributions move us a step 
closer toward a theory of the family firm (Chrisman et al., 2005; Conner, 1991). 
Transaction cost theory can be used to address other pertinent issues in family business studies. 
Apart from the factors that we have singled out in this article, there are likely to be other 
contingencies that affect the relative desirability of different governance structures in family 
firms. These include family culture (Dyer, 1988; Mieghem, 1999) and the extent to which the 
family firm has moved to a professional management structure (Chua et al., 2009). The impact of 
transaction cost factors might also vary in family firms depending on lifecycle stages, industry, 
or the imminence of succession. For example, when succession is close at hand outsourcing 
decisions may be affected by whether the intended successor is a family member or not, as well 
as the assessments of the incumbent regarding the capabilities of the successor. Furthermore, 
after succession has taken place outsourcing decisions may hinge as much on whether the new 
leader desires to preserve or break with the past (see Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003) as 
it does on the relative importance of economizing on transactions. As with the other factors 
discussed in this article, these contingencies are likely to shift the perceived trade-offs between 
economizing on transactions and other goals. 
Research is also needed to compare the performance of family firms that outsource with family 
firms that do not. As emphasized throughout this article and in the family business literature in 
general (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2005), such studies also need to consider that family firms seek to 
achieve a mixture of economic and noneconomic goals. Therefore, an assessment of how 
outsourcing or a lack thereof contributes to family harmony, employment opportunities for 
family members in the firm, and the general preservation of the socioemotional wealth of the 
family (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) should also be taken into account. 
Although we focus on whether the governance structure of family firms will lead them to 
outsource, many family firms are also likely to become suppliers to nonfamily firms (Kimura, 
2002). Since asset specificity can affect suppliers as well as buyers (Noteboom, 1993) and the 
governance structures of family and nonfamily firms appear to be different, research should also 
investigate the extent to which family and nonfamily firms become suppliers for other firms, as 
well as the performance implications of those decisions for both buying and supplying firms. 
Finally, our transaction cost theory arguments have implications for family firm owners and 
managers. Since transaction costs can influence a family firm’s governance decisions and these 
decisions in turn will influence family firm performance, our article can help firm owners and 
managers understand how to make more effective governance decisions. Perhaps the most 
important message of this article for family owners and managers, however, is that although 
economizing on transactions should be a driver of firm governance it is not the only factor that 
must be taken into account. Family firms pursue a variety of goals that sometimes conflict and 
sometimes are complementary (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). The better these goals are understood 
and articulated the better decision makers will be able to make informed governance decisions. 
In closing, transaction cost theory helps explain governance decisions in family and nonfamily 
firms, as well as differences among family firms. Since such distinctions have theoretical and 
practical value, further work on how family firms economize on transactions is needed. 
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Notes 
1. The unit of analysis in Williamson’s (1981) transaction cost theory is the transaction. 
Therefore, whether the firm engages in a particular transaction frequently or infrequently is 
important and frequency of transactions is thus another dimension of transaction cost theory. 
Outsourcing is a decision worth analyzing only when the transaction is frequent and ongoing 
because of the inefficiencies associated with conducting infrequent transactions that require 
substantial investments in human and financial capital in-house. Thus, we assume that the 
outsourcing decision involves transactions that are frequent and ongoing for both family and 
nonfamily firms and do not deal with the frequency dimension in this article. 
2. As suggested above, outsourcing can be conducted through either hybrid or market 
governance. However, since the most fundamental choice a firm must make is between 
hierarchical and nonhierarchical governance, we focus on that choice rather than the form of 
nonhierarchical governance a firm might select.  
3. We also expect that outsourcing to kin-controlled suppliers will be through hybrid governance 
rather than market governance. 
4. As suggested by Gomez-Mejia, Makri, and Larraza-Kintana (2010), the extent to which family 
firms weigh economic and noneconomic goals in decision making may be influenced by 
perceived hazards to firm performance if the status quo is maintained. 
References 
Alvarez, S. A., & Barney, J. B. (2004). Organizing rent generation and appropriation: Toward a 
theory of the entrepreneurial firm. Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 621-635. 
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. (2007). The development of organizational 
social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44, 73-95. 
Arrow, K. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of 
market versus nonmarket allocation. In The analysis and evaluation of public expenditure: The 
PPB system (A compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of 
the United States, Vol. 1, pp. 59-73). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of 
Management Review, 14, 20-39. 
Atamturk, A., & Hochbaum, D. S. (2001). Capacity acquisition, subcontracting, and lot sizing. 
Management Science, 47, 1081-1100. 
Basco, R., & Rodriguez, M. J. P. (2009). Studying the family enterprise holistically: Evidence 
for integrated family and business systems. Family Business Review, 22, 82-95. 
Blois, K. J. (1972). Vertical quasi-integration. Journal of Industrial Economics, 20, 253-273.  
Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58, 2167-
2201. 
Campbell, T. S. (1979). Optimal investment financing decisions and the value of confidentiality. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 14, 913-924. 
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled firms. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 249-265. 
Chang, E. P. C., Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2008). Regional economy as 
a determinant of the prevalence of family firms in the United States: A preliminary report. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32, 559-573.  
Chang, E. P. C., Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., Kellermanns, F. W., 
& Chua, J. H. (2009). Family social capital, venture preparedness, and start-up decisions: A 
study of Hispanic entrepreneurs in New England. Family Business Review, 22, 279-292. 
Chiles, T. H., & McMackin, J. F. (1996). Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and 
transaction cost economics. Academy of Management Review, 21, 73-99. 
Choi, T. Y., & Krause, D. R. (2006). The supply base and its complexity: Implications for 
transaction costs, risks, responsiveness, and innovation. Journal of Operations Management, 24, 
637-652. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. (2003). A unified systems perspective of family firm 
performance: An extension and integration. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 467-472. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Litz, R. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-
family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28, 335-354. 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Sharma, P. (2005). Trends and directions in the development of a 
strategic management theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 555-
575. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the 
professionalized family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33, 355-372. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Sharma, P. (1999). Defining the family business behavior. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23, 19-39. 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16): 386-405. 
Coff, R. W. (1999). When competitive advantage doesn’t lead to performance: The resource-
based view and stakeholder bargaining power. Organization Science, 10, 119-133. 
Conner, K. (1991). A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought 
within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm? Journal of 
Management, 17, 121-154. 
Corbetta, G., & Salvato, C. (2004). Self-serving or selfactualizing? Models of man and agency 
costs in different types of family firms: A commentary on “Comparing the agency costs of 
family and non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence.” Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 28, 355-362. 
Craig, J. B., Dibrell, C., & Davis, P. S. (2008). Leveraging family-based brand identity to 
enhance firm competitiveness and performance in family businesses. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 46, 351-371. 
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
David, R. J., & Han, S.-K. (2004). A systematic assessment of the empirical support for 
transaction cost economics. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 39-58. 
Demsetz, H. (1986). Corporate control, insider trading, and rates of return. American Economic 
Review, 76, 313-316. 
Distelberg, B., & Blow, A. (IN PRESS). Variations in family systems boundaries. Family 
Business Review. 
Dyer, W. G. (1988). Culture and continuity in family firms. Family Business Review, 1, 37-50. 
Dyer, W. G. (2003). The family: The missing variable in organizational research. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27, 401-416. 
Dyer, W. G., & Handler, W. (1994). Entrepreneurship and family business: Exploring the 
connections. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 19, 71-83. 
Dyer, W. G., Jr., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary 
evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 785-802. 
Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2007). Destructive and productive family relationships: 
A stewardship theory perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 22, 545-565. 
Gedajlovic, E., & Carney, M. (2010). Markets, hierarchies, and families: Toward a transaction 
cost theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 1145-1171. 
Gedajlovic, E., Lubatkin, M. H., & Schulze, W. S. (2004). Crossing the threshold from founder 
management to professional management: A governance perspective. Journal of Management 
Studies, 41, 899-913. 
Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., Hampton, M. M., & Lansberg, I. (1997). Generation to generation: 
Life cycles of the family business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006). Make, buy, or ally: A transaction cost 
theory meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 519-543. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 
(2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from 
Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 106-137. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). Diversification decisions in 
family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47, 223-252. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency 
contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 81-95. 
Gulati, R. (1995). Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 619-652. 
Habbershon, T. G., & Williams, M. L. (1999). A resource-based framework for assessing the 
strategic advantages of family firms. Family Business Review, 12, 1-25. 
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 31, 405-440. 
Hill, C. W. L. (1995). National institutional structures, transaction cost economizing and 
competitive advantage: The case of Japan. Organization Science, 6, 119-131. 
Hoy, F., & Verser, T. G. (1994). Emerging business, emerging field: Entrepreneurship and the 
family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 19, 9-23. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Karra, N., Tracey, P., & Phillips, N. (2006). Altruism and agency in the family firm: Exploring 
the role of family, kinship, and ethnicity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 861-877. 
Kawasaki, S., & McMillan, J. (1987). The design of contracts: Evidence from Japanese 
subcontracting. Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 1, 327-349. 
Kellermanns, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. (2004). Feuding families: When conflict does a family 
firm good. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28, 209-228. 
Kelly, L. M., Athanassiou, N., & Crittenden, W. F. (2000). Founder centrality and strategic 
behavior in the family-owned firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 25, 27-42.  
Kim, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005). Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency 
theory: An organizational economics approach to strategic management. Management and 
Decision Economics, 26, 223-242. 
Kimura, F. (2002). Subcontracting and the performance of small and medium firms in Japan. 
Small Business Economics, 18, 163-175. 
Lafontaine, F., & Slade, M. (2007). Vertical integration and firm boundaries: The evidence. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45, 629-685. 
Lajili, K., & Mahoney, J. T. (2006). Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions 
on vertical financial ownership and contracting: Electronic integration as an organizational form 
choice. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27, 573-586. 
Landa, J. T. (1981). A theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group: An institutional 
alternative to contract law. Journal of Legal Studies, 10, 349-362. 
Laughunn, D. J., Payne, J. W., & Crum, R. (1980). Managerial risk preferences for below target 
returns. Management Science, 26, 1238-1249. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2006). Why do some family businesses out-compete? 
Governance, long-term orientations, and sustainable capability. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 30, 731-746. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D., & Steier, L. (2004). Toward an integrative model of effective 
FOB succession. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28, 305-328. 
Leiblein, M. J., & Miller, D. J. (2003). An empirical examination of transaction- and firm-level 
influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 839-854. 
Leiblein, M. J., Reuer, J. J., & Dalsace, F. (2002). Do make or buy decisions matter? The 
influence of organizational governance on technological performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 23, 817-833. 
Lubatkin, M. H., Schulze, W. S., Ling, Y., & Dino, R. N. (2005). The effects of parental altruism 
on the governance of family-managed firms. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 313-330. 
Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction cost economics: An assessment of 
empirical research in the social sciences. Business and Politics, 10, 1-64. 
Melin, L., & Nordqvist, M. (2007). The reflexive dynamics of institutionalization: The case of 
family business. Strategic Organization, 5, 321-333. 
Mieghem, J. A. V. (1999). Coordinating investment, production, and subcontracting. 
Management Science, 45, 954-971. 
Miller, D., Steier, L., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2003). Lost in time: Intergenerational succession, 
change, and failure in family business. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 513-531. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business groups. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27, 367-382.  
Morgan, G. (1986). Images of organization. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Mustakallio, M., Autio, E., & Zahra, S. A. (2002). Relational and contractual governance in 
family firms: Effects on strategic decision making. Family Business Review, 15, 205-222. 
North, D. C. (1984). Government and the cost of exchange in history. Journal of Economic 
History, 44, 255-264.  
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 97-112. 
Noteboom, B. (1993). Research note: An analysis of specificity in transaction cost economics. 
Organization Studies, 14, 443-451. 
Noteboom, B. (1996). Trust, opportunism and governance: A process and control model. 
Organization Studies, 17, 985-1010. 
Ouchi, W. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 129-
142. 
Pearson, A. W., Carr, J. C., & Shaw, J. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: A social capital 
perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32, 949-969. 
Peng, Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China’s transition economy. American 
Journal of Sociology, 109, 1045-1074. 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of the growth of the firm. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Pollak, R. A. (1985). A transaction cost approach to families and households. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 23, 581-608. 
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (1998). Testing alternative theories of the firm: Transaction cost, 
knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information 
services. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 853-877. 
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Ram, M., & Holliday, R. (1993). Relative merits: Family culture and kinship in family firms. 
Sociology, 27, 629-648. 
Romano, C. A., Tanewski, G. A., & Smyrnios, K. X. (2001). Capital structure decision making: 
A model for family business. Journal of Business Venturing, 16, 285-310.  
Savage, L. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2002). Altruism, agency, and the 
competitiveness of family firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23, 247-259. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency relationships 
in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12, 99-116. 
Sharma, P. (2008). Commentary: Familiness: Capital stocks and flows between family and 
business. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32, 971-977. 
Sharma, P., & Irving, P. G. (2005). Four bases of family business successor commitment: 
Antecedents and consequences. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 13-33. 
Sharma, P., & Manikutty, S. (2005). Strategic divestments in family firms: Role of family 
structure and community culture. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 293-311. 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
69, 99-118. 
Simon, H. A. (1959). Theories of decision making in economics and behavioral science. 
American Economic Review, 49, 253-258.  
Simon, H. A. (1961). Administrative behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources, 
management, and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27, 
339-358. 
Stark, O. (1995). Altruism and beyond: An economic analysis of transfers within families and 
groups. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2010). Transaction cost economics (TCE) and the family firm. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 1173-1182. 
Tsang, E. (2006). W.K. Behavioral assumptions and theory development: The case of transaction 
cost economics. Strategic Management Journal, 27(11), 999-1011.  
Walker, G., & Weber, D. (1984). A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy decisions. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 373-391. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. 
American Journal of Psychology, 87, 548-577. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269-296. 
Williamson, O. E. (2005). The economics of governance. American Economic Review, 95, 1-18. 
Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992). The risk construct. In J. F. Yates (Ed.), Risk taking behavior 
(pp. 1-25). New York, NY: Wiley. 
Zahra, S. A. (2003). International expansion of U.S. manufacturing family businesses: The effect 
of ownership and involvement. Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 495-512. 
Zellweger, T. M., & Nason, R. S. (2008). A stakeholder perspective on family firm performance. 
Family Business Review, 21, 203-216. 
Bios 
Esra Memili is a doctoral candidate at Mississippi State University. She is starting her faculty 
position at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in 2011 summer. 
James J. Chrisman, PhD, is a professor of management and director of the Center of Family 
Enterprise Research at the Mississippi State University. He also holds a joint appointment as a 
research fellow at the University of Alberta’s Centre of Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise. 
Jess H. Chua, PhD, is a professor of finance and holder of the professorship in family business 
governance at the Haskayne School of Business of the University of Calgary.  
